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Abstract In this paper we focus on the beneficial role of random strate-
gies in social sciences by means of simple mathematical and computational
models. We briefly review recent results obtained by two of us in previous
contributions for the case of the Peter principle and the efficiency of a Parlia-
ment. Then, we develop a new application of random strategies to the case of
financial trading and discuss in detail our findings about forecasts of markets
dynamics.
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1 Introduction
In science and in physics in particular, noise and randomness are usually
restricted to be as low as possible in order to avoid any influence on the phe-
nomena under examination. Actually, this is not often possible and one has
to live with noise, but, on the other hand, random noise is not always so an-
noying as one might think intuitively. In fact there are many examples where
randomness has been proven to be extremely useful and beneficial. The use
of random numbers in science is very well known and Monte Carlo methods
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2are very much used since long time[1], but also in real physical experiments
random noise has been proven to be very useful and crucial to explain or
help the dynamics: stochastic resonance is probably one of the most famous
and well studied examples of this [2,3]. Of course there are many other cases
which support this claim, like noice-induced stabilization [4], noise-improved
efficiency in communication networks[5], noise-induced phase transitions [6],
etc. On the other hand, in the last years, there has been an increasing inter-
est in social phenomena by the physics community [7,8,9,10,11]. Models to
study collective behaviors in socio-economical systems, elections mechanisms,
consensus formation, management of organizations, spreading of ideas in so-
cial networks or herding effects in financial markets, have been proposed and
studied with success, providing rigorous and quantitative ways to investigate
and help understanding common dynamical laws behind social phenomena.
In this respect, it also seems to grow the feeling that the power of traditional
optimization approaches for solving complex social or economical problems
is overestimated, while, on the other hand, it is usually underestimated the
role of chance and fluctuations in these fields [12,13,14,15,16].
It is just in this spirit that we started, a few years ago, to investigate the pos-
sible use of randomness in mathematical and computational models devised
to analyze social phenomena. The first application we studied was related to
the problems raised by the so-called Peter Principle [17,18,19]. By means of
agent based simulations, we demonstrated that random promotion strategies
could stop the diffusion of incompetence in hierarchical groups, obtaining
also an increase in the global efficiency of the organization under study. Ex-
cited by the success of these first studies, we have recently investigated a way
to improve the efficiency of an institution like the Parliament by means of
random selection of part of its members [20]. We present a rapid overview of
the main results obtained for these two applications in sections 2. But the
central topic we want to address in this paper concerns the financial market
dynamics.
The very peculiar characteristic of economic and financial systems is that
their dynamics depends on their past: economic decisions taken today rely
on past expectations, whereas natural laws remain unchanged, no matter
what humans think. Thus, economic systems can be considered as feedback-
influenced systems, since agents’ expectations will influence the entire future
dynamics. Such an argument inspired the contribution of many authors who
tried to build a mechanism of beliefs formation. We can roughly say that two
main reference models of expectations have been widely established within
economic theory: the adaptive expectations model and the rational expecta-
tion model. We will not proceed in the formal description of such approaches,
but we can fruitfully report the main difference between them. The adaptive
expectations model (named after Arrow and Nerlove [21]), has been devel-
oped in contributions by Friedman [22,23], Phelps [24], and Cagan [25] and
assumes that the value of a variable is a somehow weighted average of its
past values. Whereas, the rational expectations approach (whose birth dates
back to contributions by Muth [26], Lucas [27], and Sargent-Wallace [28],
assumes that agents know exactly the entire model describing the economic
system and, since they are endowed by perfect information, their forecast for
3any variable coincides with the objective prediction provided by theory.
As one can easily understand, the possibility to make predictions is abso-
lutely central in economic theory. In financial markets, this problem is even
more urgent, since the extremely high volatility and the strong instability
that everyday can be observed on those markets. This leads to articulated
theories of trading that try to forecast market dynamics in order to realize
profits from intermediation. There is not unanimity of opinions, in economic
literature, about the actual possibility of traders to predict financial values.
The so-called Efficient Market Hypothesis, which refers to the rational ex-
pectation models, consider the role of rationality of agents as the main and
most important part of market dynamics, whereas an adaptive approach is
oriented in building forecasts from past dynamics.
Financial crises showed that mechanisms and trading strategies are not im-
mune from failures. Their periodic success is not free of charge: catastrophic
events burns enormous values in dollars. Are we sure that elaborated strate-
gies fit the unpredictable dynamics of markets? Are analysts aware that
without having complete information, with non perfect markets, no ratio-
nal mechanism can be invoked in financial transactions? In order to reply to
these questions a simple simulation will be done. It will perform a compar-
ative analysis of performances between trading strategies: two very famous
and reliable technical strategies (namely momentum and RSI-divergence [29,
30]) that traders adopt everyday for their operations in real markets, versus
a random strategy. Rational expectations theorists would immediately bet
that the random strategy will easily loose the competition, but this is not
the case, as we discuss in section 3, where we present new detailed numerical
results. Conclusions are drawn in Section 4.
2 Improving the efficiency of social groups or organizations by
means of random strategies
2.1 The case of the Peter Principle
The Peter principle was enunciated by the Canadian psychologist Lawrence
J. Peter in a famous book of the 60s [17] based on some sensible assump-
tions on the transfer of skills from one level of a hierarchical organization
to the next one. The principle states that ”in a hierarchical organization
each member rises the hierarchy, as a result of meritocratic promotions, up
to when he/she reaches its minimum level of competence”. Even if it sounds
paradoxical, according to Peter such a perverse effect surely occurs when-
ever promoted people do change their task passing from the previous to the
next level: in this way, incompetence will inevitably spread at the top of the
organization, endangering its proper functioning. In refs. [18,19] it has been
demonstrated by means of numerical simulations, that the principle is true
under certain conditions and that one can overcome its effects by adopting
random promotions. In the following we explain the details of the models
used and the main results obtained.
The first model studied in ref. [18], considered a schematic pyramidal orga-
nization with 160 positions divided into six levels. Each level had a different
4number of members with a different responsibility according to the hierar-
chical position. The members of the organization were characterized by their
age, in the interval 18-60 years, and their degree of competence in the range
1-10. As initial conditions we selected ages and competences following normal
distributions. At each time step of one year, if members reach an age over
the retirement threshold ( fixed at 60 years) or have a competence lower than
the dismissal threshold (fixed at 4) they leave the organization and someone
from the level immediately below (or from outside for the initial bottom level)
has to be selected for promotion. Four different competing strategies of pro-
motions were taken into account: promotion of the best worker, promotion
of the worst, promotion of a random worker and promotion in an alternate
way of the best and of the worst. Two different mechanisms of competence
transmission were also considered:
1) Common Sense (CS) - if the features required from one level to the upper
are enough stable, the new competence at the upper level is correlated with
the previous one and the agent maintains his competence with a small error;
2) Peter Hypothesis (PH) - if the features required from one level to the
upper can change considerably, the new competence at the upper level is not
correlated with the previous one, so the new competence is again randomly
assigned for each promotion.
The global efficiency E was defined by summing the competences of the mem-
bers level by level, multiplied by the level-dependent factor of responsibility,
ranging from 0 to 1 and linearly increasing on climbing the hierarchy. If Ci
is the total competence of level i-th, the global efficiency can be written as
E(%) =
∑
6
i=1
Ciri
Max(E)·N · 100, where Max(E) =
∑6
i=1(10 ·ni) · ri/N , and ni is the
number of agents of level i-th.
The main results found after averaging over many different realizations of
the initial conditions, confirmed the risk of incompetence spreading when
the Peter Hypothesis holds. In particular it was found that promoting the
best members is a winning strategy only if the CS hypothesis holds, otherwise
is a loosing one. On the contrary, if the PH holds, the best strategy becomes
that one of even promoting the worst member. On the other hand, if one
does not know which of the two hypothesis holds, then adopting a random
promotion strategy, or alternating the promotion of the best and the worst
candidates, results to be always a winning choice.
Although the paper was quite successful and appreciated also for its simplic-
ity [31], its paradoxical results needed a confirmation within a more realistic
model. To this end in a second model [19] it was adopted a schematic modular
organization, i.e. a hierarchical tree network with K = 5 levels, where each
agent (node) at levels k = 1, 2, 3, 4 (excluding the bottom level with k = 5)
has exactly L first subordinates (i.e. first neighbors at level k+1), which will
fill that position when it will become empty. This means that, at variance
with the pyramidal schematic model of our first paper, in this case promoted
agents could follow the links to ascend through levels. On the other hand,
neglecting the links and promoting agents from the entire level k to the next
level k − 1, one could recover the pyramidal model as a particular case.
In the inset of Fig.1 we show an example of such a hierarchical tree network,
with K = 5 levels and L = 5, for a total of N = 781 agents. The respon-
5Fig. 1 The dynamical evolution of the model efficiency gain during the first 20
years. One can observe an immediate increase of the efficiency since the beginning of
the adoption of a random strategy with respect to a meritocratic one with the Peter
hypothesis, see text for further details. The topology of the modular hierarchical
organization considered is also shown in the top left part of the figure.
sibility value is 0.2 for the bottom level and increases linearly, like in the
previous model, with step 0.2 for each level up to the top one, whose respon-
sibility value is 1. Another improvement of the second model was the time
units adopted, which becomes one month instead of one year. Moreover, in-
stead of studying the improvements with respect to an arbitrary initial state
for the organization (with an arbitrary value of the initial global efficiency,
as done in [17]), we evaluated a relative global efficiency Er(%), calculated
with respect to a fixed transient during which a meritocratic strategy (i.e.
the promotion of the best workers coupled with the Peter hypothesis) was
always applied. We introduced also a new ”mixed” strategy, where a differ-
ent increasing percentage of random promotions with respect to meritocratic
strategy is considered. Finally, we either considered promotions of a member
from a level to the next one following the links (neighbors mode) or without
considering the links of the hierarchical tree (global mode), in order to reduce
the new model to that one considered in ref. [18].
In Fig.1 we report, as an example, the relative efficiency as function of time
for the neighbors mode. A period of 240 months (20 years) was considered
and an average over 30 different realizations of the initial conditions was
performed in order to diminish the effect of fluctuations. Our aim was to in-
vestigate the effects of the introduction of an increasing percentage of random
promotions (from 25% to 100%) within an otherwise meritocratic strategy,
under the Peter hypothesis of competence transmission. The plot clearly
shows how even a moderate amount of randomness increases the efficiency
of the organization in a rapid and substantial way. This second model thus
confirms the results of the previous one, even for larger organizations and
6different topologies: random strategies provide a good advantage, in terms of
efficiency, with respect to a full ”naively” meritocratic system of promotions
and, at the same time, diminish the risk of the rising of incompetence to the
top of the organization. One can refer to ref.[19] for more details.
2.2 The case of the Parliament
Stimulated by the results about the Peter principle, we started to ask if ran-
dom strategies could be useful also in the selection of members of political
institutions. In this section we discuss a recent application of random strate-
gies for improving the efficiency of a prototypical Parliament and present
the main results obtained by two of us in ref.[20]. Inspired by the so called
’Cipolla’s diagram’ [32], we realized a virtual model of one chamber of a
Parliament by characterizing its members through their attitude to promote
personal and general interest through legislative proposals. In this way we
represented individual legislators as points in the two dimensional Cipolla’s
diagram, where on the x axis is reported the personal gain and on the y-axis
the social gain (considered as the final outcome of trading relations produced
by the laws). Both the x and y coordinates of each legislator are real numbers
included in the interval [−1, 1]. In our simulations we considered a Parlia-
ment with N members and two parties or coalitions, P1 (the majority one)
and P2 (the minority one), with a different percentage of members. All the
points representing the members of a party will lie inside a circle, with a cen-
ter whose position on the Cipolla’s diagram is fixed by the average collective
behavior of all its members, and with a given radius r that fixes the extent to
which the Party tolerates dissent within it (the larger this radius, the greater
the degree of tolerance within the party; for this reason this circle was called
circle of tolerance of the party).
In [20] we found that the efficiency of the Parliament, defined as the product
of the percentage of the accepted proposals times their overall social welfare,
can be influenced by the introduction of a given number Nind of not elected
but randomly selected legislators, called ’independent’ since we assume that
they remain free from the influence of any party. These independent legisla-
tors will be represented as free points on the Cipolla diagram. The dynamics
of our model is very simple. During a legislature L each legislator, indepen-
dent or belonging to a party, can perform only two actions:
(i) he/she can propose one or more acts of Parliament, with a given personal
and social advantage depending on his/her position on the diagram.
(ii) he/she has to vote for or against a given proposal, depending on his/her
acceptance window, i.e. a rectangular subset of the Cipolla diagram into which
a proposed act has to fall in order to be accepted by the voter (whose posi-
tion fixes the lower left corner of the window). The main point is that, while
each free legislator has his/her own acceptance window, so that his/her vote
is independent from the others vote, all the legislators belonging to a party
always vote by using the same acceptance window, whose lower left corner
corresponds to the center of the circle of tolerance of their party. Further-
more, following the party discipline, any member of a party accepts all the
proposals coming from any another member of the same party (see [20] for
7Fig. 2 Simulation results for a Parliament with N = 500 members, two parties P1
and P2 and Nind independent (randomly selected) legislators. Panel (a): Average
percentage of accepted proposals vs Nind; Panel (b): Average overall social gain
vs Nind; Panel (c): Size of the three Parliament components (P1, P2 and Nind)
vs Nind; Panel (d): Global efficiency vs Nind. All the numerical points represent
averages over 100 different legislatures. See text.
further details). Once all the N members of Parliament voted for or against
a certain proposal, the latter will be accepted only if receives at least N2 + 1
favorable votes. At this point we can calculate the efficiency Eff(L) of the
Parliament during a legislature L by simply multiplying the percentage of
accepted proposals Nacc(L) times the overall social gain Y (L) they ensure
(notice that Eff(L) will be therefore expressed by a real number included in
the interval [-100,100]). In this respect, we investigated how the three quan-
tities Nacc(L), Y (L) and Eff(L) change as function of the number Nind of
independent legislators introduced in the Parliament.
In Fig.2 we present some of the main results of [20], obtained by simulating a
Parliament with N = 500 members and two parties P1 and P2 with - respec-
tively - 60% and 40% of legislators. Notice that these latter values represent
the percentages of seats assigned to both the majority and minority parties
in a given legislature after having reserved the Nind seats to the independent
legislators, therefore are values that decrease by increasing Nind.
In panels (a) and (b) we plot, respectively, the percentage of accepted propos-
als and the correspondent social gain as function of the number of indepen-
dent legislators, averaged over a set of NL = 100 legislatures, each one with
a total number of 1000 proposals but with a different random distribution
8of legislators and parties on the Cipolla’s diagram. We also repeated all the
simulations for two different values of the radius r of both the parties (0.1
and 0.4). It clearly appears that, in average, the introduction of an increasing
number of independent legislators causes a decrease in the percentage of ac-
cepted acts (since reduces the weight of the party discipline in accepting each
proposal) but, simultaneously, also produces an increase of the average social
gain of the same accepted acts (since only the proposals ensuring a higher
social gain succeed in being accepted by the majority of the Parliament in
presence of independent legislators). In both the curves two different thresh-
old values of Nind, corresponding to a change in the slope, can be recognized
and can be easily explained looking to panel (c), where the size of the two
parties P1 and P2 are reported as function of Nind (this point was not dis-
cussed in [20] so it still needs a clarification). It results that (for our choice
of parameters) the party P1 looses the absolute majority in the Parliament
for Nind > 84, therefore only over this first threshold Nacc and Y (L) start
to significantly change. The second threshold, on the other hand, takes place
when the independent component becomes, in turn, the absolute majority
of legislators, thus accelerating - respectively - the decreasing and increasing
trends of Nacc and Y (L). In any case, despite of these explanation, it remains
absolutely not trivial to predict the exact shape of these non linear curves,
and this will reflect on the difficulty of a-priori determining the resulting
efficiency.
Finally, in panel (d), we plot the product of the two previous quantities,
therefore obtaining (a-posteriori) the global efficiency of the Parliament (av-
eraged over the 100 legislatures). It is worthwhile to notice here that:
(i) for any value of Nind the global efficiency shows an increment with re-
spect to the two extreme cases Nind = 0 (only parties) and Nind = N (only
independent members and no parties); this means that, in analogy with the
results shown in the previous subsection, even a small degree of randomness
added to the system is able to increase its performance;
(ii) the combination of the two previous curves gives rise to a pronounced
peak in efficiency in correspondence of a critical value N∗ind = 140 of indepen-
dent legislators, which does not change with the radius r but only depends
on the relative size of the two parties. In [20] we discovered that it is possible
to write down an analytical formula, called efficiency golden rule, able to
exactly predict the value N∗ind as function of the total number of legislators
N and the size p (in percentage) of the majority party P1. The formula is the
following: N∗ind =
2N−4N ·(p/100)+4
1−4·(p/100) . It allows us to imagine a new electoral
system where, after ordinary elections for determining the relative sizes of
the majority and minority parties, one could use our ’golden rule’ to find out
the optimal number of independent legislators, chosen at random among all
the citizens willing to candidate (out of the parties system), able to maximize
the Parliament efficiency.
In conclusion, in this section we have shown a couple of applications of nu-
merical simulations to management and politics, with the aim to convince
the reader that some degree of randomness could play a constructive role
in improving the efficiency of our institutions. In the following section we
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Fig. 3 Panel (a): Behavior of the FTSE UK All-Share index from January, 1st
1998 to August, 3rd 2012 (14 years, 3714 days). Panel (b): Returns series for the
FTSE UK All-Share index in the same period.
will give further support to this hypothesis presenting a new application of
random strategies to financial markets.
3 Financial Markets, Randomness and Trading Strategies: The
Case Study of FTSE UK All-Share index
In 2001 a valued british psychologist, Richard Wiseman, performed an eccen-
tric experiment in order to test the predictive power of the trading strategies
in the financial markets [33]. He gave the same virtual amount of money
(5000 pounds) to three very different people, a London’s financial trader, an
astrologer and a four years old child named Tia, asking them to invest the
money in the UK stock market (the trader following his algorithms, the as-
trologer following the stars’ movements, and Tia completely at random). At
the end of a very turbulent year for the world financial markets, the result of
the competition was completely unexpected: if, on one hand, the trader and
the astrologer had lost respectively 46.2% and 6.2%, on the other hand, with
the help of her random strategy, Tia had even earned 5.8%! Other similar
experiments, with similar results, were performed by substituting the child
with a chimpanzee [33] or by selecting securities by darts [34]. However, as far
as we know, no one has yet tried to test the effectiveness of random strategies
in finance through computer simulations. This is exactly what we will do in
this section, by using the FTSE UK All-Share index series of the last 14 years
as case study.
In panel (a) of Fig.3 we plot the behavior of the FTSE UK All-Share index
I(t) from January, 1st 1998 to August, 3rd 2012, for a total of TUK = 3714
days, while in the panel (b) we report the correspondent ’returns series’,
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calculated as the ratio [I(t+1)− I(t)]/I(t) (as usually defined in the econo-
physics literature, see e.g. [14] p.38). From the latter it immediately appears,
by imagining to divide the time series into three trading windows of equal
size (of around 1200 days each), that the index behavior alternates a first
intermittent period with a more regular one, ending again with a last in-
termittent interval. A finer resolution would reveal a further, self-similar,
alternation of intermittent and regular behavior over smaller time scales, a
well known feature (which also resembles turbulence phenomena) character-
izing financial markets [12,13,14]. As previously anticipated, our goal is to
test the performance of three different trading strategies (each hypothetically
corresponging to one trader) in simply predicting, day by day, the upward
(’bullish’) or downward (’bearish’) movement of the index I(t+1) at a given
day with respect to the closing value I(t) one day before: if the prediction is
correct, the trader wins, otherwise he/she looses. In this respect we are only
interested, here, in evaluating the percentage of wins or losses guaranteed
by each strategy and at different time scales, assuming that - at every time
step - the traders perfectly know the past history of the FTSE UK All-Share
index but do not possess any other information and cannot neither exert nor
receive any influence to or from the market.
The reader must be aware that we want to evaluate the individual investor’s
ex-ante predictive capacity without assuming perfect arbitrage in the context
of a theoretical general equilibrium approach to financial markets. This is par-
ticularly important in order to avoid misleading interpretations that could
consider the previously described set of information given to our traders as
the weak form of Efficient Markets Hypothesis paradigm. The difference is
both theoretical and methodological: after Fama [35] we define efficiency in
financial markets according to the existence of perfect arbitrage. This im-
plies that if markets were inefficient, there would exist the possibility of
unexploited profits and traders would immediately operate to obtain highest
remunerations. Jensen [36] confirms such an implication exactly combining
the informative set available and the existence of trading: only when it is
impossible to make further profits, given an informative set, financial mar-
kets are efficient. This is the rationale behind the distinction made by Fama
[35] among three degrees of efficiency: namely ”weak”, ”semi-strong”, and
”strong”, according with the completeness of the informative set. Thus, it is
theoretically consequent that, if the Efficient Markets Hypothesis held, the
financial markets would result complete, efficient and perfectly competitive.
This implies that, in presence of complete information, randomness should
play no role, since the Efficient Market Hypothesis would generate a perfect
trading strategy, able to predict exactly the market values, embedding all the
information about short and long positions worldwide. On the other hand,
the lack of complete information makes efficiency impossible to be reached.
In this case, randomness could be a beneficial tool to face the lack of infor-
mation. We test here precisely this hypothesis: if a trader presumed the lack
of complete information through all the market (i.e. the unpredictability of
stock prices dynamics [37,38,39,40,41,42,43]), an ex-ante random trading
strategy would perform, on average, as good as well-known trading strate-
gies.
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The three strategies we will adopt in the present study are the following:
1) Random (RND) Strategy This strategy is the simplest one, since the cor-
respondent trader makes his/her ’bullish or ’bearish’ prediction at the time t
completely at random (with uniform distribution), like Tia in the Wiseman’s
experiment. The other two strategies, on the contrary, are based on two in-
dicators that are very well known by financial traders.
2) Momentum-based (MOM) Strategy This strategy is based on the so called
’momentum’ M(t) indicator, i.e. the difference between the value I(t) and
the value I(t − τM ), being τM a given trading interval (expressed in days).
Then if M(t) = I(t)− I(t− τM ) > 0, the trader predicts an increment of the
closing index for the next day (i.e. it predicts that I(t + 1) − I(t) > 0) and
vice-versa. In the following simulations we will consider τM = 7 days, since
this is one of the most used time lag for the momentum indicator.
3) RSI-based Strategy This latter strategy is based on a more complex in-
dicator called ’RSI’ (Relative Strength Index) [29]. It is considered a mea-
sure of the stock’s recent trading strength and its definition is: RSI(t) =
100− 100/[1+RS(t)], where RS(t, τRSI) is the ratio between the sum of the
positive returns and the sum of the negative returns occurred during the last
τRSI days before t. Once calculated the RSI index for all the days included
in a given time-window of length TRSI immediately preceding the time t, the
trader which follows the RSI strategy makes his/her prediction on the basis
of a possible reversal of the market trend, revealed by the so called ’diver-
gence’ between the original FTSE UK All-Share series and the new RSI one
(see [29] for more details). In our simplified model, the presence of such a
divergence translates into a change in the prediction of the I(t + 1) − I(t)
sign, depending on the ’bullish or ’bearish’ trend of the previous TRSI days.
In the following simulations we will choose τRSI = TRSI = 14 days, since
- again - this value is one of the mostly used in RSI-based actual trading
strategies [30].
In Fig.4 we report a first comparison of the simulations results for our three
strategies, applied to the FTSE UK All-Share series. In particular, we test
the performance of the strategies by dividing the whole series into a sequence
of Nw trading windows of equal size Tw = TUK/Nw (in days) and evaluating
the number of wins for each strategy inside each window while the traders
move along the series day by day, from t = 0 to t = TUK . This procedure,
varying Nw, allows us to explore the behavior of the various strategies at
several time scales (ranging, approximatively, from 6 months to 5 years). In
the first row of Fig.4 we plot the volatility of the FTSE UK All-Share index,
calculated for 4 increasing values of Nw: from left to right, we consider 3, 9,
18 and 30 windows with size Tw equal to, respectively, 1237, 412, 206 and
123 days. In the three rows below we plot, in correspondence of the same
4 windows configurations, the values of the percentage of wins for the three
strategies within each window, averaged over 10 different runs (in this first
set of simulations such an average is meaningful only for the random strategy,
since the other two strategies are completely deterministic, once fixed their
characteristic parameters and the trading series).
Differences between the Random strategy (RND, second row) and the two
standard trading strategies (MOM and RSI, third and fourth row) are evi-
12
0 1 2 3
0e+00
2e-04
4e-04
6e-04
8e-04
Vo
la
til
ity
0 1 2 3
40
45
50
55
60
R
N
D
 S
tra
te
gy
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0 3 6 9 12 15 18
windows
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 3 6 9 12 15 18 0 5 10 15 20 25 30
0 1 2 3
40
45
50
55
60
M
O
M
 S
tra
te
gy
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 3 6 9 12 15 18
0 1 2 3
windows
40
45
50
55
60
R
SI
 S
tra
te
gy
 
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
windows
0 5 10 15 20 25 30
windows
Fig. 4 Simulations results: the FTSE UK All-Share series is divided into an in-
creasing number of trading-windows of equal size, in order to simulate different
time scales. In the first row the volatility of the index, calculated inside each win-
dow, is shown for comparison. In the other rows, the percentages of wins for the
three strategies, averaged over 10 different runs inside each window, are reported.
A 50% dashed line is also plotted as reference. See text.
dent. Actually, at any time scale (but in particular for large values of Nw),
the RND appears much less fluctuating (i.e. less risky) than the others. Fur-
thermore, MOM and RSI performances seem to behave slightly worse than
the RND one at the beginning and at the end of the whole FTSE UK All-
Share series, i.e. when the market behavior is more intermittent - as shown
by the correspondent higher volatility.
In Fig.5 we can better appreciate this quite surprising result by observing,
in panel (a), the percentage of wins for the three strategies averaged over all
the windows in each one of several configurations with different Nw (rang-
ing from 3 to 30 with step 3) and, in panel (b), the correspondent standard
deviations. From the first histogram it appears that the average gains of the
three strategies are comparable and restricted in a narrow band just below
the 50% of wins, with a slight advantage of the RND one (which, however,
could depend on the trading series chosen for the analysis). At the same time,
the second histogram confirms the higher stability of the random strategy
over the other ones. The fact that none of the three strategies overcomes the
threshold of 50% could seem paradoxical, but we stress that this is true only
averaging over the whole FTSE UK All-Share series, whereas, of course, they
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Fig. 5 Panel (a): Percentages of wins for the three strategies (magnified on the
y-axis in order to better appreciate the comparison) averaged over all the windows
in each one of 10 different subdivisions of the FTSE UK All-Share series, with an
increasing number of windows (reported on the x-axis). Panel (b): The correspon-
dent total standard deviations for the same configurations of windows and for the
three strategies. See text.
can exceed that threshold within single trading windows, as also visible in
Fig.4. These findings seem to suggest that - as also observed by Taleb [16] -
the success of a trading strategy at a small time scale would probably depend
much more on luck than on the real effectiveness of the adopted algorithm,
since on a large time scale its performance is comparable with (or, as in this
case, even worse than) a random one.
At this point, following the results surveyed in the previous section, one may
suspect that the introduction of some randomness into the standard, other-
wise deterministic, trading strategies (MOM and RSI), could play a beneficial
role. In the next figures we actually show that this is indeed the case.
In Fig.6 we present plots similar to those in Fig.4, but with an increasing per-
14
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Fig. 6 Volatility and average percentage of wins (inside each window and over
10 runs) for the three traders, as in Fig.4, but with an increasing quantity of
randomness mixed with the MOM and the RSI strategies. Panel(a): PRND = 20%;
Panel (b): PRND = 50%; Panel (c): PRND = 70%. See text.
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Fig. 7 Average percentage of wins (left column) with the correspondent standard
deviations (right column) calculated over all the windows for the same configura-
tions shown in Fig.6 and for the same three values of PRND.
centage PRND of random predictions mixed with the two standard trading
strategies, i.e. 20% in panel (a), 50% in panel (b), 70% in panel (c), respec-
tively. It immediately appears that the introduction of even a relatively small
quantity of ’noise’ (i.e. of random choices) in the MOM and RSI strategies
improves their performance, in terms of both enhancing the average number
of wins per window and stabilizing its fluctuations (i.e. reducing the trading
risk) in each configuration (different columns). In this case, of course, the
average over 10 runs performed inside each window (as in Fig.6) makes sense
for all the three strategies (notice that we repeat here all the calculations also
for the RND strategy, thus reinforcing the previous results). We summarize
these results in Fig.7, where we report a synthesis of both the averages and
the standard deviations calculated over all the trading windows for the same
configurations shown in Fig.6. It is evident that already for PRND = 50% the
average gain of the MOM and RSI strategies becomes comparable with RND
strategy (left column), as well as the corresponding fluctuations (right col-
umn). This further supports the analogy with the results found for the social
systems presented in the first section, where the beneficial role of random-
16
ness could be appreciated even in moderate doses: actually, the same seems
to happen also in financial trading, at least for the two standard strategies
we considered in this paper.
The rationale behind the advantages to adopt some kind of random strategy
for trading in financial markets, as suggested some years ago by the experi-
ments of Wiseman and now corroborated by the results of our simulations,
is twofold. On one hand, the intrinsic turbulent nature of financial markets
makes any long term prediction about their behavior very difficult with the
instruments of standard financial analysis, whose mathematical models are
often based on unrealistic assumptions [12]. Such assumptions usually lead
the traders to underestimate both the risks they face and the role of chance in
the possible success of their strategies, at least until the next big market crash
suddenly comes to reset their capital [16]. In this respect, the effectiveness
of random strategies could be probably related to their stronger agreement
with the turbulent and erratic essence of the financial markets. On the other
hand, last but not least, random strategies are also very cheap to implement:
following them, everyone can invest in the stock market by himself/herself,
reducing the efforts to gather expensive information and without resorting
to costly financial consultants or to complicate trading rules.
4 Conclusions
In this paper we have explored the beneficial role of random strategies in
social and financial systems. We presented a short review of recent results
obtained in the managerial and political fields and then we focused our at-
tention on financial markets. In particular, we numerically simulated the
performance of three trading strategies (one completely random and two
chosen among the most popular ones adopted by traders) applied to the
FTSE UK All-Share index series, chosen here as a case study, in order to
compare their predictive capability. Our results clearly indicate that (i) the
standard strategies, with their algorithms based on the past history of the in-
dex, do not perform better than the purely random one, which, on the other
hand, is also much less risky, and (ii) that the introduction of some degree of
randomness in the same strategies significantly improves their performance.
This means that random strategies offer also in the financial field a better
and costless alternative to the traditionally adopted strategies, minimizing
both risk and volatility. Of course one should investigate these findings on
different stock price index series and consider a broader set of strategies in
order to test the robustness and generality of these results. A study in this
direction is in progress [44].
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